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Abstracts	  
Paper	  1:	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Board	  Independence	  on	  Busy	  Directors	  and	  Firm	  Value:	  Evidence	  from	  Regulatory	  Changes	  in	  Sweden.”I	  
use	   an	   exogenous	   change	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   corporate	   governance	   for	   Swedish	   firms	   in	   2005	   to	   identify	   the	   causal	  
effects	  of	  changes	  in	  board	  structure	  on	  firm	   value.	   The	  new	  rules	  require	  there	  to	  be	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  independent	  
directors	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  large	  firms.	  This	  offers	  a	  quasi-­‐experimental	  setting	   where	  I	  test	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  changes	  to	  
board	   independence	   on	   the	  market	   valuation	  of	   firms	  measured	  by	  Tobin’s	  Q.	   In	  order	  to	   identify	   the	  effects	  of	   this	  
shock,	   and	   alleviate	   endogeneity	   issues	   inherent	   to	   corporate	   governance	   studies,	   I	   use	   a	   regression	   discontinuity	  
design	  to	  capture	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  market	  to	  the	  new	  governance	  rules,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  large	  
firms	  are	  required	   to	  comply	  with	  the	  code.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  (a)	  the	  market	  reacts	  negatively	   to	  the	  enactment	  
of	   the	   new	   governance	   rules,	   and	   (b)	   target	   firms	   that	   complied	   with	   the	   independence	   requirement	  have	  a	   lower	  
Tobin’s	  Q	  than	  non-­‐target	  firms.	   I	  further	  investigate	  potential	  causes	  behind	  the	  estimated	  negative	  effect	  by	  looking	  at	  
the	   busyness	  of	   independent	   directors.	   The	   code	   imposes	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   independent	   directors	   but	  
does	   not	   restrict	   the	   number	   of	   outside	   directorships	   they	   can	   hold.	   Thus,	   an	   increase	   in	   board	   independence	   can	  
lead	  to	   an	  increase	  in	  board	  busyness,	  which	  can	  explain	  the	  negative	  reaction	  from	  the	  market.	   Results	  indicate	  that	  
in	   reaction	   to	   the	   code,	   target	   firms	   have	  more	   busy	   independent	   directors	   than	   non-­‐target	   firms,	   and	   this	   effect	   is	  
stronger	  for	  target	  firms	  that	  complied	  with	  the	  independence	  requirement.	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  words:	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Paper	  2:“The	  Value	  of	  a	  Directorship	  in	  the	  Eyes	  of	  Busy	  Directors.”	  I	  study	  the	  effects	  of	  directors'	  reputation	  incentives	  on	  their	  
commitment	  to	  board	  duties	  and	  assess	  their	   impact	  on	  the	  market	  valuation	  of	  firms	  in	  Sweden.	  Using	  social	  network	  theory,	   I	  
measure	  the	  reputation	  of	  boards	  and	  directors	  based	  on	  their	  centrality	  in	  their	  respective	  networks.	  The	  more	  central	  a	  firm	  is	  
relative	  to	  other	  firms	   in	  the	  network,	  the	  more	  reputation	   incentives	   it	  supplies	  to	   its	  directors.	  First,	   I	   look	  at	  how	  the	  relative	  
reputation	  of	   firms	  can	  affect	  directors'	   commitment	  of	   time	  and	  effort.	   I	   find	   that	   the	  probability	   for	  outside	  directors	   to	  miss	  
board	  meetings	  in	  firms	  they	  consider	  more	  prestigious	  is	  lower	  than	  that	  for	  directors	  who	  consider	  those	  firms	  less	  prestigious.	  
Second,	   I	  aggregate	  the	  reputational	   incentives	  of	  directors	  to	  the	  board	  level,	  which	  allows	  me	  to	  measure	  how	  directors	  value	  
their	  directorships	  differently.	  Accordingly,	  I	  find	  that	  firms	  with	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  independent	  directors	  who	  consider	  them	  
more	   prestigious	  witness	   a	   significantly	   better	   firm	   valuation	   than	   firms	  with	  more	   directors	   considering	   them	   less	   prestigious.	  
Third,	   I	   study	   the	   effect	   of	   appointing	   reputable	   directors	   to	   the	   board	   in	   a	   given	   year	   on	   shareholders'	  wealth	   in	   subsequent	  
periods.	  Similar	  to	  board	  network,	  I	  measure	  the	  talent	  and	  reputation	  of	  individual	  directors	  by	  relying	  on	  their	  centrality	  in	  the	  
overall	  director	  network.	  Directors	  with	  high	  centrality	  scores	  are	  better	  connected	  and	  have	  better	  access	  to	  information	  relative	  
to	  directors	  who	  are	   less	  central.	   I	   find	   that	   recruiting	   reputable	  directors	   leads	   to	  a	  better	  market	  valuation	   for	   firms,	  and	   this	  
effect	   is	   specific	   to	   independent	   directors.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   appointing	   independent	   directors	   with	   low	   reputation	   leads	   to	  
reduced	   shareholder's	   wealth.	   Finally,	   I	   find	   that	   using	   network	   centrality	   as	   a	   measure	   of	   reputation	   generates	   statistically	  
stronger	  results	  compared	  with	  the	  use	  of	  relative	  firm	  size.	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Paper	  3:“Investor	  Protection	  and	  the	  Predictability	  of	  Dividends	  and	  Returns:	  A	  Cross	  Country	  Comparison.”	  	  
I	  study	  return	  and	  dividend	  growth	  predictability	  in	  59	  countries.	  I	  find	  that	  dividend	  growth	  predictability	  is	  the	  dominant	  form	  of	  
predictability	   in	  small	  and	  medium	  size	  countries,	  whereas	  return	  predictability	   is	  more	  present	   in	   large	  markets	  such	  as	  the	  US,	  
the	  UK	  and	  Japan.	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  this	  finding,	  I	  investigate	  if	  shared	  corporate	  governance	  characteristics	  across	  countries	  can	  
explain	   this	   predictive	   pattern.	   I	   measure	   governance	   quality	   using	   eight	   indices	   that	   capture	   different	   aspects	   of	   investor	  
protection,	   the	   quality	   of	   legal	   systems,	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   capital	  markets	   (Djankov	   et	   al.,	   2008).	  Using	  mean	   clustering,	   I	  
classify	  countries	  into	  three	  portfolios	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  governance	  quality.	  I	  find	  that	  expectations	  about	  dividend	  growth	  
explain	  most	  of	   the	   variation	   in	  dividend	  yields	   in	   countries	  with	   low	   investor	  protection,	  whereas	   return	  predictability	   is	  more	  
dominant	  in	  countries	  with	  large	  capital	  markets	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  investor	  protection.	  Finally,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  does	  
not	  seem	  to	  be	  related	  to	  one	  particular	  form	  of	  predictability.	  	  	  
Key	   words:	   Dividend	   yield,	   predictability,	   corporate	   governance	   quality,	   investor	   protection,	   dividend	   smoothing,	   clustering,	  
international	  stock	  markets	  
JEL	  classification:	  G12,	  G15,	  G34,	  G38	  	  	  
ISBN:978-91-88199-03-4 (tryckt), 978-91-88199-04-1 (PDF) 
 
Contact information: Mohamed-Reda Moursli, Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of 
Gothenburg, P.O.Box 640, SE 405 30, Gothenburg, Sweden. Tel: +46 31 786 2553. E-post: reda.moursli@cff.gu.se 
	  
